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We test the interest rate sensitivity of subprime credit card borrowers using a unique panel data
set from a UK credit card company. What is novel about our contribution is that we were given
details of a randomized interest rate experiment conducted by the lender between October 2006
and January 2007. We ￿nd that individuals who tend to utilize their credit limits fully do not
reduce their demand for credit when subject to increases in interest rates as high as 3 percentage
points. This ￿nding is naturally interpreted as evidence of binding liquidity constraints. We
also demonstrate the importance of truly exogenous variation in interest rates when estimating
credit demand elasticities. We show that estimating a standard credit demand equation with
nonexperimental variation leads to seriously biased estimates even when conditioning on a rich
set of controls and individual ￿xed e⁄ects. In particular, this procedure results in a large and
statistically signi￿cant 3-month elasticity of credit card debt with respect to interest rates even
though the experimental estimate of the same elasticity is neither economically nor statistically
di⁄erent from zero.
Keywords: subprime credit; randomized trials; liquidity constraints.
JEL Classi￿cation: D11, D12, D141 Introduction
Borrowing rates a⁄ect ￿rms￿and households￿demand for credit. Quantifying such e⁄ects, i.e.,
estimating credit demand elasticities, has become an increasingly important academic endeav-
our. At the micro level, lenders are interested in gauging these elasticities as an input to their
optimal loan pricing strategies. At the macro level, knowledge of these elasticities is essential for
the conduct of monetary policy. Moreover, they can be informative regarding whether house-
holds are credit constrained. This is of course important given policy concern with the ￿nances
of poor and vulnerable households.
In estimating the sensitivity of credit demand to borrowing rates, the major di¢ culty faced
by researchers is that genuinely exogenous variation in borrowing rates is rarely observed. For
example, the observed cross sectional variation in interest rates is likely to be endogenous
to borrowing and repayment behavior through unobservable characteristics of the borrowers.
Researchers try to overcome this problem by using quasi-experimental designs. Attanasio et al
(2008) estimate interest rate elasticities of car loan demand exploiting the tax reform of 1986 in
the US. Alessie et al (2005) analyze the same issue using a similar design. Gross and Souleles
(2002) use the US Credit Bureau data and exploit some ￿rm-speci￿c practices to instrument
borrowing rates. Adams et al (2007) use data on a US private subprime auto loan company. The
general conclusion drawn from the studies is that there seems to be no sensitivity to borrowing
rates among low income households. However, such households display some sensitivity to
loan features related to liquidity, such as down payment requirements, credit limits and loan
maturities. This ￿nding is interpreted as the presence of binding liquidity constraints1. All the
studies mentioned above rely on identifying assumptions and may be subject to criticism.
Similar to the literature cited above, we estimate the sensitivity of credit demand to interest
rates. For this, we use a unique panel data set on detailed credit card transactions from a private
1The exception is the Gross and Souleles (2002) study where the authors ￿nd evidence of signi￿cant elasticity
of credit card debt with respect to interest rates.
1credit card company that exclusively serves the subprime market in the United Kingdom2. What
is novel about our study is that our lender varied interest rates applied to revolving debt via
randomized experiments. One of these experiments, designed in July 2006 and implemented in
October 2006, has been made available to us. Therefore we have the opportunity to estimate
the e⁄ect of truly exogenous changes in borrowing rates on the demand for credit card debt.
To our knowledge, this paper is the ￿rst to estimate interest rate sensitivity of credit demand
in a developed market using a randomized interest rate experiment.
Karlan and Zinman (2007) is the only previous paper we are aware of to use experimental
variation in interest rates to estimate the interest rate sensitivity of credit demand. Karlan
and Zinman show that the demand for new term loans in South Africa exhibits modest interest
rate sensitivity, with demand apparently more sensitive to loan maturity (that is, minimum
payments). Our analysis di⁄ers from Karlan and Zinman in a number of key respects. First,
we study the interest rate sensitivity of credit card debt, rather than new term loans. Second,
we study a developed economy (the UK) with a highly sophisticated credit market. Lenders
in countries like the UK have access to advanced risk pricing technologies. For this reason,
the estimates of credit elasticities and evidence of market failure in a developing country is
not directly relevant for highly developed countries like the UK, even in a subprime market.
Thus our analysis provides novel evidence on the functioning of subprime lending markets in
developed economies, on the prevalence of credit constraints in such economies, and on the role
of credit card debt in consumption smoothing among subprime consumers in such economies.
This evidence is critical to the conduct of monetary policy and the development of public policy
with respect to household ￿nance in the UK and other similarly developed economies.
Besides the availability of experimental variation in borrowing rates, the distinct character-
istics of subprime borrowers such as low income and impaired credit history make our sample
2For con￿dentiality reasons, we do not disclose the name of the company. We will refer to it as the "lender"
from here on.
2an interesting ground to estimate the sensitivity to borrowing rates. For one thing, we can
comfortably assume that individuals in our data set are likely to be net borrowers. A borrower
who is currently not liquidity constrained is expected to lower his consumption via either low-
ering his purchases on credit or making more payments toward his balance when faced with an
increase in interest rates3. On the other hand, a borrower who is constrained by his credit limit
is not likely to change his consumption following a (small) interest rate change. Hence, if we
de￿ne monthly new credit card borrowing as monthly purchases on credit minus the payments
made toward the outstanding balance (this is the monthly addition to the existing credit card
debt that accrues interest), we expect to see no change in new credit card borrowing for such
individuals4.
Our lender carried out the experiment using a block design where a randomly selected sample
of accounts were assigned to 9 cells based on their utilization rates (monthly balance divided
by credit limit) and an internally developed behavior score that summarizes individuals￿risk
characteristics (following the practice of the lender, we will refer to these blocks as ￿ cells￿ ). This
design is motivated by the lender￿ s risk pricing practice but it serves our purposes well as the
ex-ante conditioning on observables yields more precisely estimated average treatment e⁄ects5.
After allocating the experiment sample into 9 cells in July 2006, the lender randomly selected a
number of individuals in each cell and allocated them into control groups. The treatment groups
(remaining individuals) in each cell received interest rate increases of 3 or 1 percentage points in
October 2006 depending on the cell they were in July 2006. The lender lowered the interest rate
of one cell￿ s treatment group by 3 percentage points. We are able to observe the individuals
for 3 months after the interest rate changes, October, November and December 2006. Since
3The prediction may be di⁄erent for interest rate reductions. A prudent borrower may not be responsive to
a (small) decrease in interest rates as he takes into account that liqudity constraints, even though not binding
currently, may bind in the future.
4Note that the latter prediction refers to the strongest de￿nition of liquidity constraints where there is an
actual quantity limit to borrowing. One can also extend the notion of liquidity constraint to individuals who face
increasing borrowing cost with quantity demanded as in Pissarides (1978).
5See Du￿ o et al (2006).
3we were not involved in the design or the implementation of this experiment, we ￿rst employ
several tests to establish whether our lender performed randomization properly. After multiple
tests, we conclude that our lender carried out randomization properly.
First, we estimate the average treatment e⁄ects of interest rate changes on new credit card
borrowing for each cell. We then estimate average treatment e⁄ects by month. We also estimate
average treatment e⁄ects by conditioning on a number of borrower characteristics that are, by
design, independent of the treatment, such as age, income and whether the individual has any
other credit card. We ￿nd that individuals who utilize their credit limits fully are insensitive to
purely exogenous increases in interest rates as high as 3 percentage points. We interpret this
￿nding as evidence of binding liquidity constraints among this group.
The nonexperimental literature cited above has strived to ￿nd good instruments for borrow-
ing rates. In this paper, we also illustrate the importance of this endeavour. More speci￿cally,
we show the importance of exploiting only the exogenous variation in interest rates when es-
timating borrowing demand equations. Overall interest rate variation in our sample includes
pre-treatment cross sectional variation within cells and cross cell variation, which are undoubt-
edly endogenous, as well as exogenous within cell variation generated by the experiment. Since
we have full information on the way in which interest rates changed in October 2006, we can
assess the degree of bias caused by the endogeneity. We ￿nd a statistically signi￿cant debt
reduction of £24 (implying -1.05 elasticity) over the period of 3 months in the case of a 1
percentage point increase in interest rates when we ignore the lender￿ s experiment. When we
estimate the demand equation using the experimental variation in interest rates, we ￿nd that
the same elasticity is neither economically nor statistically di⁄erent from zero. The estimated
sensitivity to interest rates using the nonexperimental data is quite misleading and hides the
fact that subprime credit card borrowers do not decummulate debt in the face of increasing
borrowing costs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We provide a brief overview of the UK credit
4card market in the next section. In Section 3, we present a simple life cycle model to motivate
the choice of our outcome variable. Data and the experimental design are explained in detail in
section 4. We assess the lender￿ s experiment to pin down the expected statistical and economic
e⁄ects in Section 5. We present and discuss the experimental and nonexperimental estimates
in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Subprime Credit Card Market in the UK
Credit cards have steadily grown in importance as a payment device in all industrialized coun-
tries. As of 2007, it is estimated that approximately 70 million credit cards were in issue in the
UK (see Data Monitor Report (2008)). Moreover, borrowing on credit cards (revolving credit
card debt from one month to the next, therefore incurring interest charges) grew rapidly over
the last few decades in the UK, attracting much attention from consumer protection groups,
regulatory bodies and, of course, the media. In 2007 total credit card debt stood at around £65
billion, representing approximately 30% of consumer credit in the UK.
Consumers who are not considered suitable for unsecured credit by the mainstream issuers
comprise the UK "nonstandard" credit card market. By de￿nition, individuals deemed to be
nonstandard borrowers are more di¢ cult to evaluate in terms of default risk. This can be due
to volatile income (many self-employed), low income (unemployed), the lack of credit history in
the UK, or impaired credit history due to past defaults or mortgage arrears. Approximately 7
million individuals in the UK fall into this category, and they are in possession of approximately
6 million nonstandard credit cards as of 2007 (8.6% of total credit cards in issue)6. The average
member of the nonstandard population has 0.85 cards whereas the average number of cards
held by the prime segment is 1.5. The most distinctive feature of a nonstandard credit card is
the high interest charged for the revolving debt. The rate is typically around 30-40%, with the
6Reasons to fall into the non-standard catagory are: absence of a bank account, unemployment, being an
income support claimant, CCJs record, mortgage arrears and repossesions record, bankruptcy record and being
a self employed with less than three years￿proof of income.
5highest observed rate around 70% 7. A typical nonstandard borrower usually starts with a very
small credit limit like £150 and the credit limit generally remains around £5008.
The term "subprime" refers to a subsection of the nonstandard market in the UK. This
subsection usually comprises individuals with adverse credit histories i.e., individuals with an
even higher risk of default than the typical nonstandard individual. Therefore, issuers who
target this segment exclusively (such as our lender) invest heavily in advanced risk based pricing
practices to combat the adverse e⁄ect of delinquencies and bankruptcies. Our lender serves the
"subprime" segment and targets self employed individuals with low income and individuals who
are a⁄ected by County Court Judgements (CCJs)9. The presence of CCJs, in general, is the
most common reason to fall into the subprime category. As of 2007, the number of credit cards
held by individuals with a CCJ was approximately 2.9 million. The second most common reason
is being self-employed (1.3 million cards).
3 Theoretical Framework
In this section we lay out a simple dynamic model of consumption tailored for individuals in
our data set. The exposition is intended to determine a meaningful choice variable for credit
card borrowing. This variable is then used as an outcome variable to estimate interest rate
sensitivity.
Assume that the generic individual is a lifetime utility maximizer with a time separable
utility function. Assume further that the only tool available to him to implement his desired
consumption pro￿le is credit card borrowing. His problem can be written as a two period
7A policy of interest rate ceilings for credit has not been adopted in the UK. Such policies, although debated,
are considered conterproductive as they may drive vulnarable consumers such as those with low income and/or
limited credit history into illegal credit markets.
8To provide a comparison, the interest rate applied to a typical mainstream card is around 15-18% with a
credit limit of £ 2000 and above.
9County Court Judgement refers to an adverse ruling of the County Court against a person who has not
satis￿ed debt payments with their creditors. An adverse ruling remains on the individual￿ s record for six years
from the date of judgement. CCJs are the attribute most comonly associated with subprime individuals in the
UK. Unfortunately we do not have information on whether an individual has a CCJ or not in our data set.
6problem in the usual way:
MaxU(Ct) + ￿Et[Vt+1(Dt+1)] (1)
where Ct is consumption in period t, ￿ is a subjective discount factor (￿ = 1=(1+￿) where ￿ is
the rate of time preference), Dt is the credit card debt (equivalent to negative assets) for period
t. Et[Vt+1(Dt+1)] is the expected future value of debt. Assuming monthly periods, the state
variable debt evolves as follows
Dt+1 = (1 + rt+1)Dt + NTt;t+1 ￿ Pt+1 (2)
where rt+1 is the interest rate applied to debt revolved from month t, NTt;t+1 is new purchases
made on credit between period t and t + 1, Pt+1 is the payment made for the balance of
period t + 1: Notice that NTt;t+1 is interest exempt between period t and t + 110. De￿ne ￿ net
new borrowing￿NNBt+1 as new monthly purchases minus the payment made toward the total
outstanding balance:
NNBt+1 = NTt;t+1 ￿ Pt+1 (3)
If NTt;t+1 ￿ Pt+1 > 0; the di⁄erence accrues interest charges until paid.
For most credit card products, monthly payment Pt is subject to
Pt > Max[￿Bt;￿] (4)
where Bt is the statement balance (interest accrued debt plus new purchases), ￿ is the fraction
used to calculate required minimum payment, and ￿ is a known amount to be paid if ￿Bt < ￿.
10In fact, it is interest exempt until the payment due date which falls between t + 1 and t + 2:
7For example, the value of ￿ for our lender is
￿ = 3% of monthly balance
￿ = $5
Note that having a credit card means that the individual is pre-approved for a loan subject
to a given credit limit. Therefore, our analysis should be based on internal rather than external
margin. Another important feature of credit card debt is that changes in interest rates apply
to all existing debt. Hence, when faced with an increase in interest rate, individual￿ s debt
and required minimum payment automatically increase due to the additional interest charges.
For these reasons, for a given month t, the actual choice variable for the individual is the net
new borrowing NNBt
11: An individual who is a net borrower is expected to lower his net new
borrowing when faced by an increase in the borrowing rate if he were not severely liquidity
constrained in the ￿rst place. He will do so by either reducing his new monthly purchases
on credit, NT, or by increasing his monthly payments, P (or both): It is clear that either
action means a reduction in consumption for the borrower. For such an individual monthly
consumption can be described as
Ct;t+1 = Yt + NTt;t+1 ￿ Pt+1 (5)
where Yt is monthly income (likely to be stochastic). We expect however, no sensitivity of NNBt
to increases in interest rates for the individuals who are constrained by their credit limits. In
what follows we implement our empirical strategy using NNBt as our outcome variable.
11Note that the payment variable is Pt+1 = ￿Bt +DPt+1 where ￿Bt is the required minimum payment that is
determined by the statement balance and therefore interest rate sensitive, DPt+1 can be called the￿ discretionary
payment￿made over and above the minimum payment required. In the case that the payment constraint in
equation (4) binds, NTt;t+1 ￿ DPt+1 is the correct choice variable. For what follows however, we will use
Pt+1 instead of DPt+1 to construct NNBt+1 as even a 3 percentage point increase in interest rates creates
economically too small an increase in the minimum payment requirement. Morever, DPt+1(our construction) is
a noisier variable than Pt+1 (given us by the lender):
84 Data and Experimental Design
Our data set is provided to us by a private credit card issuer which operates in the subprime
segment of the UK market. It speci￿cally targets self employed individuals with low income and
individuals who are a⁄ected by County Court Judgements (CCJs). For con￿dentiality reasons,
the limited number of nonstandard credit card issuers in the UK prevents us from giving the
exact market share of our lender. Nevertheless, we can say that it is one of the major players in
the subprime market. It has several credit card products all with conditions typically observed
in subprime markets such as high interest rates and low credit limits. The data set comprises all
individual transactions including purchases, payments and interest charges, as well as minimum
payment requirements. We also have income, age and marital status reported by individuals
at the application stage. Unfortunately, we do not have information about individuals￿other
credit commitments such as mortgages and other consumer loans.
Since 2006, the lender has routinely performed randomized interest rate experiments on sub-
samples of their clients. The company further informed us that they only raised (or lowered)
interest rates on individual accounts via controlled experiments, not in any other fashion. Each
experiment lasted around 3-6 months and the lender initiated another experiment immediately
following the previous one. Interest rate changes were permanent until the next change took ef-
fect. The proportion of individuals allocated to control groups became increasingly smaller with
each new experiment. All interest rate experiments were designed based on ex-ante determined
blocks which we will explain in greater detail below.
The lender agreed to provide us with one of the experiments that was designed in July
2006 and implemented in October 2006, involving 18,900 individuals. In January 2007, another
experiment was implemented with 27,000 individuals and some of the individuals in our experi-
ment were included in the next experiment. Therefore, the e⁄ect of interest rate changes can be
cleanly measured only over the three months following the implementation of the experiment.
9The experimental sample was not chosen from the lender￿ s full clientele base. Accounts that
are ￿ agged for reasons such as default, several months of delinquency or inactivity are excluded
before the selection of the sample. Furthermore, the lender excluded individuals who have been
with the lender for less than seven months at the time of the design (July 2006). For the
experiment we have, all of this resulted in the exclusion of approximately 40% of the accounts.
Table 1 presents the characteristics of the individuals in our sample. Values are calculated for
the month in which individuals were assigned to treatment and control groups (July 2006).
The average individual in our sample is 41 years of age. Median income reported at the
application stage is £15,000. Given the median individual income for the UK is about £19,000,
individuals in our sample represent the lower end of the income distribution. Approximately
60% of the individuals report that they are employed, and approximately 35% of them report
that they own their residence. Some useful information we will use later is that about 40%
of the individuals in our sample do not own any credit card other than the one issued by our
lender.
The average monthly utilization rate, de￿ned as outstanding monthly balance divided by the
credit limit, is about 73% with the median value of 90%. The average utilization rate for all UK
credit card borrowers is approximately 34% (see BIS (2010)). Two other statistics highlighting
the di⁄erences between our average borrower versus the average UK borrower are the interest
rates and credit limits. The mean (median) interest rate is 31.8% pa (32.9% pa) (note that
this is the situation as at July 2006, thus before the implementation of the experiment). These
interest rates are signi￿cantly higher than the rates on typical UK credit cards (approximately
15-18% pa).
The mean (median) credit limit is £1,080 (£950), much lower than the average UK credit
card limit of £5,129 in 2007. During the sample period, the lender changed credit limits for
both treatment and control (independent of the treatment status as we established through our
statistical analysis). Between July 2006 and December 2006 approximately 52% of our sample
10received no credit limit change, 38% received a change once, and approximately 10% received
a change twice. It is worth noting that the lender very rarely lowered the credit limit; only
2.3% of all credit limit changes (involving only 198 individuals) within the sample period were
negative.
As Table 1 shows, the average monthly purchase value is about £77 with the median value
of £0. It is worth drawing attention to the size of revolving debt in the table. This ￿gure is
calculated as the individual￿ s balance appeared on the June 2006 statement minus the payments
made by the due date applied to that balance12. Therefore it is the actual revolving debt that
the interest charge is applied to. The mean revolving debt as at July 2006 is approximately
£650 with the median value being £552. This is quite a large ￿gure considering a monthly
interest rate of about 2.5% 13. It is clear that a signi￿cant portion of the individuals in our data
set use their card for borrowing purposes. To be precise, approximately 81% of the individuals
in our sample revolved debt every month between the period of July 2006 and December 2006.
Perhaps the most intriguing feature of our data is that the lender changed its clients￿interest
rates only through randomized trials since 2006, not in any other fashion. They carried out the
randomization as a block design where a sample of individuals were assigned to cells de￿ned
by the interaction of utilization rates and internally developed behavior scores that summarize
individuals￿risk characteristics14. Individuals were allocated into cells according to their uti-
lization rates and behavior scores as at July 2006. After the allocation, the randomization was
performed within cells. Table 2 presents the cell design, the type of treatment received and the
sample sizes of each cell15. For example, cell 1 contains individuals who had high utilization
12Our data set contains information based on the statement cycle as well as based on calendar month. Therefore
we are able to calculate the debt variable accurately.
13Monthly interest charged on £ 650 of revolving debt that is subject to 30% interest rate would be approxi-
mately £ 16.
14Internally developed credit scoring systems are general practice for credit card issuer. We do not know the
exact features of our lender￿ s scoring system but we were informed that it is a continously updated multivariate
probit type algorithm.
15After the actual randomization, the lender added a small number of extra individuals to cells 1,2 and 3 to be
treated and this made the treated group di⁄erent from the control. Fortunately, we have the speci￿c identi￿er
for these individuals and we exclude them from our analysis.
11rates and low behavior scores (high default risk) in July 2006. In this cell, 337 individuals
received a 3 percentage point increase in interest rates while 413 individuals were in the control
group. Similarly, cell 9 contains individuals who had low utilization rates and high behavior
score (low default risk) in July 2006. In this cell, 499 individuals received a 3 percentage points
reduction in interest rates while 1424 individuals were in the control group. For cell 6, the
lender did not allocate any individual to a control group, making the cell unavailable for our
purposes. Our private conversations with the lender suggest that selection ratios are based on
pro￿tability concerns rather than statistical power concerns.
As can be seen from the cell design, the treatment is not homogenous across cells; cells with
low behavior scores (cells 1, 2 and 3) received a 3 percentage point increase in interest rates
whereas cells 4, 5, 7 and 8 received a 1 percentage point increase. Note also that the cross
sectional distribution of interest rates prior to the implementation did not di⁄er across cells. It
is clear from this design that we cannot estimate the overall average treatment e⁄ect for the
entire sample. For example, since a 3 percentage point decrease in interest rate was given only to
individuals with high behavior scores and low utilization rates (cell 9), we cannot generalize the
e⁄ect of a 3 percentage point decrease in interest rates to the experimental sample. Similarly,
the estimated e⁄ect of the 3 percentage point increase can be generalized only to individuals
with low behavior scores.
4.1 Implementation
Unlike many studies that used randomized ￿eld experiments (mainly in development economics),
we were not involved in the design or implementation of the experiment our analysis is based on.
Although randomized experiments are now standard practice amongst credit card companies
and they have every incentive to implement them correctly, we need to make sure that the
randomization was carried out properly to ensure the internal validity of our results.
We perform several tests including a series of mean equality and distribution equality tests on
12a range of variables including our outcome variables. These tests were carried out for the month
of July 2006 (the date of the design) and repeated for August 2006 and September 2006 (the last
2 months before the implementation). Table 3 presents the p-values obtained from mean equality
tests and Table 4 presents the likelihood ratio statistics (￿2) from the probit regression of the
treatment dummy on several variables such as debt, interest rates, credit limit, income, age,
behavior score, utilization rate and statement balance. We also performed distribution equality
tests using Kolmogorov-Simirnov and K-Wallis tests for the variables in Table 3 (results are
available upon request) and could not detect any statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence between the
treated and the controls. We are in the end, convinced that the randomization was carried out
properly.
4.2 Other Threats to Internal Validity
Even though the randomization was carried out properly there may be other threats to the
internal validity of our experimental estimates. Sample attrition, for example, would be of par-
ticular concern if it were caused by the treatment. This could happen if the treatment (interest
rate increase) initiated delinquency and eventually default, making the remaining treatment
sample no longer comparable to the control sample. If the treatment caused some accounts
to be charged o⁄, our treatment e⁄ect estimates may be biased toward ￿nding insensitivity to
interest rates. Recall however that we can follow outcomes of the experiment only for three
months. It is unlikely that we would see any default in such a short period as it usually takes
several months of delinquency for the lender to charge the delinquent account o⁄.
However, we can explore whether the treatment induced intention to default by looking into
the number of delinquent months following the treatment. The idea here is that if the treatment
induces default, we may observe it as delinquency (missed monthly payments) starting from the
implementation date. For this, we investigate whether there is any statistically signi￿cant
di⁄erence between the treated and control in terms of falling into a delinquency cycle after
13the treatment. More speci￿cally, we test the equality of number of delinquent months between
the treated and the control groups from September 2006 to December 2006, inclusive. Table 5
presents these results (p-values for equality tests). We do not reject the hypothesis of equality
and conclude that the treatment did not induce intention to default within the sample period.
Another problem common in randomized experiments is noncompliance, that is, the possi-
bility that units allocated to the treatment group are not treated. This situation could arise in
our case if, for example, some individuals that are allocated to a treatment group objected to
the interest rate increase and the lender consequently reversed the change. Fortunately, we do
not face this problem in our sample; all accounts that are allocated into treatment groups did
receive the change in interest rates.
5 Assessing the Experimental Design
In this section we assess how informative the experimental design is in answering the questions
we pose. In particular, we would like to know ￿rst, how much of an e⁄ect we can detect
statistically and second, how much of an economic e⁄ect we can expect given the theoretical
model outlined in section 3. For the former we resort to the concept of "minimum detectable
e⁄ect". In our case it is the minimum true di⁄erence (in £) between the control and the treated
that can be statistically detectable with 80% con￿dence at a 5% signi￿cance level16.
In order to calculate expected economic e⁄ect of a change in interest rates, we ￿rst assume
a functional form for the utility function in the intertemporal model we outlined in section 3.
Following the large body of theoretical and empirical literature, we take the constant relative





16See List et al (2010) and Du￿ o et al (2006) for excellent reviews.
14where ￿ is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion reciprocal of which is the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution. Given the CRRA utility function, consider the ￿rst order condition arising
from the maximization of equation (1).
C
￿￿
t = ￿(1 + r)Et[￿t+1] (7)
where Et[￿t+1] is the expected marginal utility of consumption at t. Here we assume that the
interest rate is pre-determined (consistent with our lender￿ s practice of announcing the interest


















@ ln(1 + r)
￿
dln(1 + r) (9)
This equation simply states that a change in interest rates will have a substitution e⁄ect (￿rst
term) and an income e⁄ect (second term). For a borrower, an increase in interest rates will
lower the future consumption (increase the future marginal utility of consumption, implying a
negative income e⁄ect) so that
@ lnEt[￿t+1]
@ ln(1 + r)
> 0 (10)










15As a simple illustration, if, based on the micro evidence17, we take 1
￿ = 0:75 and monthly
income/consumption of £1400 (given the reported mean individual income in Table 1), the
above inequality implies that a 1 percent increase in (1 + r) is expected to reduce current
consumption of unconstrained borrowers by at least £10.518. Together with the calculated
minimum detectable e⁄ects, such expected economic e⁄ects will be useful in order to interpret
our experimental results in the following section.
6 Results
6.1 Experimental Estimates
The main objective of the paper is to infer the interest rate sensitivity of monthly credit card
borrowing. Individuals who would like to borrow more but have limited access to credit are
expected to be insensitive to the cost of borrowing. The sensitivity of demand for borrowing
to interest rates can be easily determined at the extensive margin; as interest rates go up, loan
take up is expected to go down for unconstrained individuals. However, testing this sensitivity
using credit card debt requires a di⁄erent treatment. As explained in section 3, once incurred,
revolved credit card debt itself is no longer the proper choice variable for a given month.
Guided by the standard intertemporal theory of consumption outlined in Section 3, we
estimate the following equation for each cell:
NNB = ￿ + ￿T + " (12)
where NNB denotes the net new borrowing and T is the treatment dummy which takes the
value of 1 if the individual is in the treatment group and 0 if the individual is in the control
17See Attanasio et al (1999), Alan (2006) and Alan and Browning (2010).
18Remember that individuals in our sample are assumed to be net borrowers, or simply "hand to mouth" con-
sumers with no savings. It is also important to note that theoretically, the income income e⁄ect is realized at the
time when interest rate change is communicated. Therefore, expected economic e⁄ect after the implementation
is only the substitution e⁄ect.
16group. The fact that the randomization was carried out properly assures us that there would
be no observable or unobservable di⁄erence between the treatment and the control group other
than receiving the treatment. Then the coe¢ cient ￿ in the above regression will give us an
unbiased estimate of the average e⁄ect of treatment on the treated (AETT). For individuals
who are currently liquidity constrained, we expect that the estimated average treatment e⁄ect
is not statistically di⁄erent from zero. This should be true for small interest rate increases. In
our data set, those individuals are likely to be the ones with high utilization rates (cells 1, 4
and 7).
Borrowers with low utilization rates are expected to lower their consumption (equivalent to
lowering NNBt in this framework) when faced with an increase in interest rates since they do
have available borrowing opportunities but they choose not to fully utilize them (they could
borrow more on this card). Cells 2,3,5,8 and 9 ￿t this description. The mean utilization rate
was approximately 50% for cells 2,5 and 8, and around 10% for cells 3 and 9 in July 2006.
An important point that will be relevant when it comes to interpretation of the experimental
results is that the type of treatment di⁄ers (slightly) across cells. For cell 1 for example, the
estimate of equation (14) measures sensitivity to a 3 percentage point increase in interest rates,
whereas for cell 4, it measures the e⁄ect of a 1 percentage point increase. Therefore, we cannot
provide the overall AETT for the entire sample. However, we will be able to do this when
we impose linearity in the next subsection. Note also that given the existing cross sectional
variation in interest rates, percentage increase in interest rates in a given cell will depend on
the pre-treatment interest rates. For example, in cell 1 where the treatment group received 3
percentage point increase, an individual with 30% pre-treatment rate will have a 10% increase
in his borrowing rate.
In order to estimate the average treatment e⁄ect, ￿rst, we compare the means across indi-
viduals and months by running the following regression for each cell:
17NNBit = ￿ + ￿T + "it: (13)
Then, to see if there is any delayed response to the interest rate changes, we estimate the average
treatment e⁄ect by months by running the following regression
NNBit = ￿+￿1T+￿2November+￿3December+￿4November￿T+￿5December￿T+￿it : (14)
Here, ￿1 is the estimated average treatment e⁄ect for October, ￿1 + ￿4 is for November and
￿1 + ￿5 is for December.
Following the standard practice, we correct the standard errors to take into account the
panel structure and the possibility of heterogenous treatment e⁄ects. Table 6 presents average
treatment e⁄ects and minimum detectable e⁄ects by cell. The ￿rst column of the table gives
the mean net new borrowing for the control groups (￿), the second column presents average
treatment e⁄ects (￿).
Looking at the ￿rst column of the table, one notices that the mean net new borrowing
for the control group in the high utilization cells is negative and around £14; it is positive
and around £8-£10 in the mid utilization cells and relatively high (around £32-£38) for low
utilization cells (cells 3 and 9). This tells us that not much new borrowing takes place in the
high utilization cells, in fact we see a small amount of debt reduction (a negative NNB value) by
these individuals. The question is whether there is any di⁄erence between the treated and the
control. As seen in the second column of the table, we do not detect any statistically signi￿cant
di⁄erence in net new borrowing between the control and treated in any cell.
The numbers in column 3 give the minimum true di⁄erence (in £) between the control and
the treated needed to be statistically detectable with 80% con￿dence given a 5% signi￿cance
level. For example, if in cell 1, the true change in net new borrowing due to the treatment of
18a 3 percentage point increase was greater than £19.5, we would be able to detect it with 80%
con￿dence, given our choice of signi￿cance level. The last column presents the lower bound
of absolute consumption change expected given the discussion in section 5. The values in this
column are calculated using the mean pre-treatment interest rates (approximately 32%), mean
monthly consumption of £1400 (calculated using mean annual income divided by 12) and an
elasticity of intertemporal substitution of 0.75.
Consider ￿rst the high utilization cells. These are cells 1, 4 and 7 with the utilization rates
very close to 100 %. Except for cell 1, these are also the highly populated cells by design, so
treatment e⁄ects are estimated precisely. Individuals in these cells tend to revolve large amounts
of debt from month to month and pay heavy interest charges. Among all the account holders
in our sample, these are the ones who may want to borrow more but may not be able to do
so, and may be credit constrained and insensitive to interest rates. The fact that we estimate
no statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence between the control and the treated is no surprise. Note
that for these cells, mean NNB for the control is around £14 (where a negative sign means
lowering existing debt). The estimated mean di⁄erence is higher for cell 1 (-£9.7) which could
be because this cell received a 3 percentage point increase in their interest rates while the other
two cells received only a 1 percentage point increase. For cells 4 and 7, the average treatment
e⁄ects are economically negligible (£0.07 and -£1.2 respectively). Given the small minimum
detectable e⁄ects we do not have much doubt that the true sensitivity must be e⁄ectively zero
for these cells. This insensitivity result for the high utilization cells carries through when we
estimate the average treatment e⁄ects month by month (see Table 7).
What about the low utilization cells? Individuals in these cells are not liquidity constrained
in the strong sense of the term as they can borrow more on this card. The mean net new
borrowing for the control groups in these cells is all positive and decreasing with utilization
rates. Individuals who were in mid utilization cells in July 2006 (cells 2 ,5 and 8) seem to acquire
£7-£10 new debt every month, whereas the number is about £30-£40 for individuals who were in
19low utilization cells, although the means are imprecisely estimated for cells 2 and 5. For cells 2,
5 and 8 (with an average utilization rate around 50%) and cells 3 and 9 (with average utilization
rate around 10%) we ￿nd statistically zero average treatment e⁄ects. Note however that the
minimum detectable e⁄ects are large for these cells. Given the expected economic e⁄ects, our
estimates will not be precise enough to detect the expected e⁄ect with any con￿dence (minimum
detectable e⁄ects are larger than expected economic e⁄ects). For example, consider cell 5. The
expected consumption decline due to a 1 percentage point increase in interest rates is at least
£8. The minimum detectable e⁄ect for this cell is £25 implying that it is very unlikely for us to
detect a true e⁄ect. While we do not feel con￿dent about the results obtained from cell-by-cell
estimation, in Subsection 6.3, we con￿rm these "insensitivity" results when pooling across all
low utilization cells.
6.2 Heterogeneity in Treatment E⁄ects
Based on the discussion above, the apparent insensitivity to interest rates by borrowers who
utilize their credit limits fully can be interpreted as evidence of binding liquidity constraints
among this group. It is generally accepted that liquidity constraints are more likely to a⁄ect the
young and those with low income. In our case, having no other credit card than the one issued
by our lender may also indicate the actual credit limit the individual is facing. A very high uti-
lization individual who reported to possess no other credit card would be the likeliest candidate
to be constrained in the strong sense of the term. On the other hand, individuals who reported
to have other credit cards may have the ￿ exibility to transfer their balances (subject to some
switching costs) to other cards when faced with an increase in interest rates. Such a transfer
clearly would not change the individual￿ s overall debt holding (no reduction in consumption)
but would seem that way in our sample due to the observed payment. Unfortunately, we have
no way of knowing the nature of the payments, whether it is a balance transfer to another
card or a genuine payment, made toward balances. Balance transfers would bias our results
20toward ￿nding sensitivity, and the estimated magnitude of consumption reduction should then
be considered as an upper bound.
Table 8 presents estimated average treatment e⁄ects conditional on having other credit
cards, age and income19. Results in this table are generally very similar to our previous results.
We see no interest rate sensitivity in any cell, whether individuals have other credit cards or not.
The numbers do not show any clear pattern. A possible explanation for this may be that the
other credit cards these individuals hold are likely to be equally high interest rate cards since
they were willing to apply for a new high interest rate card. Anecdotal evidence also suggests
that some individuals apply for a new high interest rate card when they fully utilize their other
high interest rate cards.
In contrast to the ￿ndings of Attanasio et al (2008) and Alessie et al (2005), we do not ￿nd
any signi￿cant di⁄erence between high and low income individuals with the exception of cell
1 where we estimate about £31 reduction in net new borrowing for individuals who reported
income over £20,000 (columns 5 and 6 in Table 8). Note, however, that the distinction between
high and low income is only relative in our case, as almost all our individuals have low income.
In summary, we ￿nd no evidence of sensitivity to either a 1 or 3 percentage point increase (or the
3 percentage point decrease, cell 9) in our sample, even after conditioning on variables that are
thought to be useful in characterizing unconstrained individuals, such as being middle aged and
older, and possessing multiple credit cards. This result was largely expected for the individuals
who were fully utilizing their credit cards (and among those who have no other credit cards).
6.3 Can Econometrics Replicate the Experiment?
Credit demand equations have been estimated on nonexperimental data, usually by imposing
some exogeneity restrictions. Attanasio et al (2008), Alessie et al (2005) and Gross and Souleles
19We also condition on employment status and home ownership. Unreported results are very similar and
available upon request.
21(2002) are exemplary studies of this sort.20. These authors emphasize the potential detrimental
e⁄ects of endogenous interest rates on credit demand estimates and promote instrumental vari-
able estimation. In this section, we illustrate the importance of this choice i.e., the importance
of exploiting only exogenous variation in interest rates when estimating such equations.
It is also important to emphasize that interest rate experiments are common practices for
specialized credit card issuers, and form a part of their advance risk pricing strategies. Moreover,
even in prime credit card markets some issuers are known to conduct frequent randomized
experiments, and use these to guide changes in interest rates and changes in other characteristics
of the accounts, such as credit limits (see Gross and Souleles 2002). Without knowing the exact
experimental design (in our case, knowing the design amounts to observing the cell identi￿er)
it is not possible to isolate the exogenous variation in interest rates. This is true even without
any such experiments, but when interest rate changes are applied to certain accounts based on
some lender speci￿c information that is not available to researchers.
In our data, in the absence of the cell identi￿er variable, we observe interest rate changes of
1, 3 and -3 percentage points for some accounts but we do not observe the proper comparison
group (individuals with no interest rate changes) for these individuals21. Using both time series




￿j￿rt￿j;i + ￿0Xi;t + ￿0MonthDummies + "i;t (15)
or to estimate interest rate elasticities of credit card debt, D and normalize credit card debt,
20Attanassio et al (2008) use the 1986 tax reform act in the US, Alessie et al (2005) use a change in the usury
law in Italy to instrument interest rates. Gross and Souleles(2002) use instruments exploiting exogenous timing
rules of credit card companies.
21It is true that we observe zero interest rate changes so we know who the controls are but without cell identi￿ers
we cannot establish proper comparison groups.
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￿j￿rt￿j;i + ￿0Xi;t + ￿0MonthDummies + "i;t (17)
where change in interest rates ￿rt = rt ￿ rt￿1: The lags are included to account for delayed
response to interest rate changes. Note that the di⁄erencing takes out cross-sectional variation
in interest rate levels. The remaining variation is the time variation and the cross-sectional
variation in interest rate changes (which is correlated with account characteristics). The above
speci￿cation can be used to estimate short-term (1 month) as well as long-term sensitivities
(and elasticities). Since we observe the accounts only for 3 more months following the interest
rate changes, we can estimate the sensitivity only up to 3-months (j = 0;1;2). Month dummies
are included to account for cyclical spending patterns. Other variables (X) include observable
characteristics of the account that may be relevant for borrowing demand. We experiment
with utilization rates (lags), internal behavior score (lags), change in credit limits (lags) and
account age. We also estimate ￿xed e⁄ects models using the above equations to account for
individual-speci￿c trends in borrowing demand.
Note that the above equations can also be estimated using only the cross-sectional variation
in interest rates in a given month which is undoubtedly endogenous. Using the panel feature
of our data we are able to illustrate that even the ￿xed e⁄ects estimators (that are designed to
control for unobserved heterogeneity) can lead to biased elasticity estimates if the endogeneity
in interest rate changes is not properly taken care of with a good instrument. We can illustrate
this important point since we do have the perfect instrument: the experiment.
The overall interest rate variation used to estimate the above equations includes cross-cell
variation, which is endogenous, as well as exogenous (experimental) within-cell variation. A
fully saturated model with a full set of cell dummies (or equivalently, bscore and utilization rate
23(as at July 2006) dummies and their interactions) isolates the experimental variation. With
a less than fully saturated model however, estimation of the above equations is subject to
standard omitted variable bias even when we control for utilization and bscore (and their lags)
since all the omitted interaction terms are, by design, correlated with interest rate changes. To
illustrate, we ￿rst estimate the above equations without cell information. We then estimate the
same equations by conditioning on cell dummies and their interaction with interest rate changes
to control for across cell variation in interest rates.
Table 9 presents the estimated 1 month and 3 month sensitivities for credit card debt (D);
debt normalized by credit limit (D=CL) and net new borrowing (NNB). The ￿rst two columns
present results without conditioning on cells that is a nonexperimental use of the data. In the
￿rst column we present estimates without the control variables (X) and ￿xed e⁄ects, the second
column adds those to the equations. We estimate a small but signi￿cant 1 month decline in
credit card debt for both speci￿cations; the estimated 1 month decline in debt is about £5
and £7 respectively for a 1 percentage point increase in interest rates (implying -0.22 and -0.25
elasticity calculated at the means). The estimated 3 month sensitivities are £12 (elasticity -
0.51) and £24 (elasticity -1.05) respectively for speci￿cations 1 and 2, and they are statistically
signi￿cant. These ￿gures seem very small but we should reemphasize that our sample mainly
consists of very low income individuals that are not expected to be interest rate sensitive at
all. Note also the statistical signi￿cance of the results. When we control for observable account
characteristics and ￿xed e⁄ects, we still estimate a signi￿cant sensitivity of net new borrowing;
a 1 percentage point increase in interest rates leads to a £14 decrease in new borrowing (in
three months)22.
We tried several other controls (income, individual￿ s age, employment status etc.) and
22Unfortunately, there is no study to which we can directly compare our results in this section. Although
Gross and Souleles (2002) estimate elasticities of credit card debt with respect to interest rates, their sample
represents all US credit card holders. Nevertheles, they ￿nd approximately $100 decline in debt in 9 months for
each percentage point increase in interest rates. This number makes our estimate of £ 24 decline in 3 months
look quite big, especially if one considers the fact that our sample covers the low end of the income distribution
in the UK.
24established that the ￿nding of signi￿cant debt reduction in 3 months is quite robust. This is
also true when we normalize debt by the credit limit. For net new borrowing, the results are very
sensitive to di⁄erent speci￿cations. We obtain responses ranging from statistically signi￿cant
and large negative to statistically signi￿cant and large positive depending on which controls
we use. This ￿nding is enough in itself to cast doubt on nonexperimental estimates without
convincing exogenous variation in interest rates or interest rate changes.
The last column in Table 9 presents the experimental estimates. We show only speci￿cation
1 as, not surprisingly, the other speci￿cation (￿xed e⁄ects estimation) gave materially the same
results. As it can be seen in this column, there is no sign of debt reduction or reduction in
new borrowing in the case of a 1 percentage point interest rate increase. All estimates are both
economically and statistically insigni￿cant. We estimate virtually zero elasticity of debt/new
borrowing with respect to borrowing rates when we isolate cross-cell variation in interest rates.
This is an additional con￿rmation of our experimental estimates presented in Section 5.1 where
we do not impose any functional form in the way we do in this section. In addition to illustrating
the importance of isolating the exogenous variation in interest rates, the results obtained in this
section are also useful to con￿rm that our "insensitivity" conclusion in Section 5.1 is not due
simply to high standard errors. We obtain the same results when pooling across cells with a
linear functional form which substantially increase the precision of the estimates.
Finally, we repeat this exercise for high and low utilization cells separately. Here, cells 1, 4
and 7 are classi￿ed as "high utilization" cells, the other cells as "low utilization" cells. Table
10 presents the results. Nonexperimental regressions include all the control variables described
earlier and account speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects. The message that emerges from this table is striking.
We ￿nd virtually no di⁄erence (economically, or statistically) between the estimates obtained
with experimental and nonexperimental data for the high utilization cells (1, 4,and 7); con￿rm-
ing our priors about binding liquidity constraints, there appears to be no sensitivity to interest
rates in these cells (compare columns 1 and 3 in Table 10). The striking contrast to this result
25comes from the low utilization cells (see columns 2 and 4). While the nonexperimental use of
the data yields an economically and statistically large response to interest rates in the direction
predicted by the intertemporal theory, the experimental results tell us a completely di⁄erent
story. With the nonexperimental use of the data, we estimate a £32 decline in debt (implying
an elasticity of -1.72) and £11 decline in net new borrowing over 3 months in response to a 1
percentage point increase in interest rates. On the other hand, the experimental variation alone
shows that these individuals in fact accumulate debt (approximately £16 over three months,
implying the elasticity of 0.85) in response to a 1 percentage point increase in interest rates.
Recall our discussion in Section 3 that when faced with an increase in interest rate, in-
dividual￿ s debt automatically increases due to additional interest charges unless the net new
borrowing declines. Since the net new borrowing is positive in low utilization cells (see Table
6, column 1), we observe an increase in debt when faced with higher interest rates. It appears
that the cross cell variation is very strong for the lower utilization group, causing signi￿cant
omitted variable bias due to nonlinearities inherited in the block design. This bias is so strong
that results obtained with mixed within and cross cell variation are materially very di⁄erent
(£32 decline versus £16 increase in 3 months). This result clearly illustrates the importance of
careful research design when estimating such demand equations.
7 Conclusion
We estimate the sensitivity of credit demand to interest rates. A unique data set on monthly
credit card transactions from a subprime credit card company that includes a randomized
interest rate experiment gives us the opportunity to carry out this task with truly exogenous
variation in interest rates. We ￿nd that individuals who utilize their credit limits fully are
insensitive to exogenous increases in interest rates as high as 3 percentage points. We interpret
this ￿nding as evidence of binding liquidity constraints.
26We also illustrate the importance of genuinely exogenous variation in interest rates in esti-
mating credit demand elasticities. We show that estimating a standard credit demand equation
with the nonexperimental variation leads to seriously biased estimates even when using a rich
set of controls and ￿xed e⁄ects. In particular, this procedure results in a large and statistically
signi￿cant 3-month elasticity of credit card debt with respect to interest rates even though the
experimental estimate of the elasticity is neither economically nor statistically di⁄erent from
zero.
We argue that this is an extremely important result as the related research on interest rate
sensitivity has far reaching implications for policies targeting credit markets. It could be even
more important for policies that tend to focus on "vulnerable" groups such as individuals with
low and volatile income, and those a⁄ected by adverse credit shocks in the past. The estimated
sensitivity to interest rates using the nonexperimental data is quite misleading and hides the fact
that subprime credit card borrowers do not tend to decummulate debt in the face of increasing
borrowing costs. In fact, the higher interest rate leads to higher debt overtime.
Our results are obtained using data from a single lender. However, this lender is an important
market player and the risk pricing practices presented here are common throughout the industry.
The randomized interest rate experiments undertaken by our lender are also not uncommon,
though access to the data is. Therefore we believe that the evidence we provide in this paper
sheds important light on the sensitivity of credit demand to borrowing rates amongst poor
households and the pervasiveness of liquidity constraints in highly sophisticated credit markets.
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29Table 1: Decriptive Statistics, July 2006
mean median st. dev.
utilization rate (%) 72:6 90:0 32:0
statement balance (£) 720:1 600:8 549:3
debt (£) 649:1 552:2 544:4
new transactions (£) 76:5 0:0 173:3
credit limit (£) 1;079:7 850:0 711:2
interest rate 31:8 32:9 3:7
income (£) 16;955 15;000 15;620
age 44:2 43 11:7
married 56% ￿ ￿
employed 61% ￿ ￿
self employed 13% ￿ ￿
home owner 35% ￿ ￿
no other card 40% ￿ ￿
Notes: Number of observations=18;232














































30Table 3: Tests for Internal Validity
Variable Cell 1 Cell 2 Cell 3 Cell 4 Cell 5 Cell 7 Cell 8 Cell 9
Utilization Rate .66 .93 .34 .51 .60 .52 .44 .41
Bscore .77 .72 .36 .14 .62 .18 .37 .87
Net New Borrowing (NNB) .22 .13 .69 .54 .21 .85 .44 .53
Revolving Debt .54 .44 .32 .12 .59 .40 .20 .46
Interest Rates .95 .47 .32 .44 .09 .79 .16 .72
Credit Limit .47 .23 .41 .40 .28 .76 .25 .45
Income .81 .66 .64 .79 .74 .40 .89 .18
Age .60 .84 .50 .84 .74 .98 .55 .84
Notes: P-values (not adjusted for multiple testing) for the mean equality tests (equal variance imposed)
Table 4: Further Internal Validity Tests
July 2006 August 2006 September 2006
cell 1 2.3 2.7 5.4
cell 2 8.5 9.5 3.9
cell 3 9.1 11.2 1.8
cell 4 10.3 13.3 12.2
cell 5 9.8 7.1 6.7
cell 7 4.9 2.9 5.3
cell 8 7.8 6.4 10.5
cell 9 9.8 8.7 11.1
Notes: Chi-square (￿
2
8) values are obtained from probit regressions of the treatment dummy on age, income,
interest rates, balance, debt, credit limit, utilization rate and bscore (July 2006). Critical value P(￿
2 > 16:9) =
0:05
Table 5: Equality of the Number of Delinquent Months, September-December 2006
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32Table 7: Experimental Estimates
Average Treatment E⁄ects by Months
NNBi;t = ￿ + ￿1T + ￿2Nov + ￿3Dec + ￿4Nov ￿ T + ￿5Dec ￿ T + "i;t
Average TE October Average TE November Average TE December
Cells ￿1 ￿1 + ￿4 ￿1 + ￿5
Cell 1 (3pp) 2.6 -11.4 -20.4
(0.8) (0.9) (1.6)
Cell 2 (3pp) 8.9 -34.3 3.2
(0.7) (1.8) (0.1)
Cell 3 (3pp) 22.1 2.3 -12.6
(0.6) (0.1) (0.3)
Cell 4 (1pp) -3.9 7.5 -3.4
(0.5) (1.6) (0.6)
Cell 5 (1pp) 9.4 -9.2 -1.8
(0.5) (0.5) (0.1)
Cell 7 (1pp) -1.5 5.0 -7.1
(0.8) (1.1) (1.4)
Cell 8 (1pp) 2.6 3.0 20.2
(0.8) (0.3) (1.7)
Cell 9 (-3pp) 3.2 0.5 16.8
(0.8) (0.0) (1.3)
Notes: Absolute t-ratios calculated with clustered standard errors in parentheses. Values are in British Pounds
(£ ).
Table 8: Experimental Estimates
Average Treatment E⁄ects (￿):
NNBi;t = ￿ + ￿T + "i;t
No Other Cards Other Cards Age<31 Age>39 Income<10000 Income>20000
Cell 1(3pp) -5.2 -13.8 5.3 -11.3 13.8 -30.6￿
(0.6) (1.3) (0.4) (1.2) (1.4) (1.8)
Cell 2 (3pp) -21.6 0.27 3.6 -6.4 -12.6 -6.0
(1.6) (0.0) (0.2) (0.4) (0.9) (0.3)
Cell 3(3pp) 9.3 1.0 -9.0 -21.6 8.3 -6.5
(0.3) (0.1) (0.3) (0.9) (0.2) (0.2)
Cell 4 (1pp) -0.36 -0.10 2.7 1.4 7.2 -4.6
(0.1) (0.0) (0.5) (0.3) (1.5) (0.7)
Cell 5 (1pp) 17.1 -11.1 -0.54 -16.1 2.8 -.52
(1.2) (1.0) (0.0) (1.2) (0.2) (0.0)
Cell 7(1pp) -3.7 0.52 -6.5 2.7 -1.9 -.52
(0.9) (0.2) (1.2) (0.8) (0.4) (0.1)
Cell 8(1pp) 5.6 9.8 4.1 4.3 6.3 11.5
(0.6) (1.6) (3.4) (0.6) (0.6) (1.2)
Cell 9(-3pp) -5.2 15.4 3.2 0.44 -3.9 4.7
(0.5) (1.3) (0.2) (0.1) (0.3) (0.3)
Notes: Absolute t-ratios calculated with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Values are in British Pounds (£ ). ￿: signi￿cant at 10% level.
33Table 9: Interest Rate Sensitivity of Credit Card Debt
Nonexperimental Experimental
Spec 1 Spec2 Spec1





￿i, (D) ￿11:7￿￿ ￿24:2￿￿ 2:5
(3:8) (4:6) (5:1)





￿i, (D=CL) ￿:008￿￿ :20￿￿ :003
(:002) (:004) (:004)





￿i, (NNB) ￿3:0 ￿14:1￿￿ ￿1:4
(3:4) (5:2) (5:6)
Notes: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. **: signi￿cant at 5%, *: signi￿cant at 10%. The ￿rst
2 columns present regressions without cell information. Values in the ￿rst column (Spec 1) are obtained from
the regressions of ￿Dt ( ￿(D=CL) and ￿NNB respectively) on change in interest rates (and its 2 lags) and
month dummies. The second column adds lags of utilization rate, bscore, change in credit limits, account age
and account-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects. Values in the last column are obtained from the regressions of ￿Dt (￿(D=CL)
and ￿NNB respectively) on change in interest rates (and its 2 lags) and month dummies (spec 1) by using the
cell information, that is, adding cell dummies and their interactions with all other right hand side variables.
34Table 10: Interest Rate Sensitivity of Credit Card Debt
Nonexperimental Experimental
High Util Low Util High Util Low Util
1 month sensitivity,￿0, (D) :35 ￿10:3￿￿ :83 3:4




￿i, (D) ￿6:3 ￿31:9￿￿ ￿4:6 15:9￿￿
(6:1) (6:5) (6:3) (8:1)
1 month sensitivity,￿0, (D=CL) :00 ￿:01￿￿ ￿:001 ￿:001




￿i, (D=CL) :001 :02￿￿ ￿:002 :012￿￿
(:005) (:005) (:005) (:005)
1 month sensitivity,￿0, (NNB) 1:4 ￿6:1 3:8 2:6




￿i, (NNB) ￿8:4 ￿11:4￿ ￿10:8 14:4
(7:6) (6:7) (6:9) (8:9)
Notes: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. **: signi￿cant at 5%, *: signi￿cant at 10%. Low Util refers
to cells 2,3,5,8,and 9, High util refers to cells 1,4 and 7. The ￿rst 2 columns present regressions without cell
information. Values in these columns (nonexperimental) are obtained from the regressions of ￿Dt (￿(D=CL)
and ￿NNB respectively) on change in interest rates (and its 2 lags), month dummies, lags of utilization rate,
bscore, change in credit limits, account age and account-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects. Values in the last two columns
(experimental) are obtained from the regressions of ￿Dt (￿(D=CL) and ￿NNB respectively) on change in
interest rates (and its 2 lags) and month dummies by using the cell information, that is, adding cell dummies
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